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Abstract 
This note examines the evolution of the relationship between the Banco Agricola de 
la Republica Dominicana and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) for 1978-1989. 
It evaluates the institutional-building impact of IDB technical cooperation as well as the 
negative impact of massive, non-selective, subsidized credit lines on the bank's financial 
viability. Recommendations for future donor interventions in Banco Agricola are included. 
THE BANCO AGRICOLA DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA AND 
THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK: 
A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW1 
Douglas H. Graham and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega2 
This note elaborates further on the experience of Banco Agricola de la Republica 
Dorninicana with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)3. In particular, the recent 
historical evolution of this relationship is explored and evaluated. Four IDB programs have 
operated within Banco Agricola in the past 12 years, as indicated in Table 1 and Graph 1. 
From 1978 to 1989, the share of IDB loans in the bank's total outstanding portfolio has 
evolved from 16 to 18 percent in the late 1970s, to 22-26 percent in the early 1980s and, 
after a sharp decline since 1987, to only 4 percent in 1989. Overall, the IDB share averaged 
15.6 percent of Banco Agricola's total portfolio for this 12-year period. 
In evaluating the changing influence of the IDB in Banco Agricola's operations, one 
should keep in mind this rise and then decline in the IDB's share of the portfolio. Clearly, 
1 This note was prepared for the Office of External Review and Evaluation (ORE) of 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), as background material for the Study 
of the IDB's Experience with Institutional Strengthening Assistance, under the 
direction of Francisco Guzman. The authors are responsible for the views expressed 
in this note, which may or may not be shared by the sponsoring institutions. 
2 The authors are Professors in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural 
Sociology at The Ohio State University. They are grateful to Ramon Aquino and 
other officials of the Banco Agricola de la Republica Dominicana for discussions 
about these issues. 
3 See Douglas H. Graham, Jeffrey Poyo, and Nelson Aguilera, "On the Viability of 
Agricultural Development Banks: Banco Agricola de la Republica Dominicana," 
Columbus, Ohio: Agricultural Finance Program, The Ohio State University, May, 
1990. 
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the !DB's influcence was more pronounced from the mid· 1910s through the early 1980s,, 
than it has been from the mid·1980s to the present. Even in the face of its declining 
portfolio share, however, the IDB1s influence on the organization and operational 
procedures of the bank has continued to be substantial. 
The IDB had a positive impact on the design and implementation of Banco 
Agricola's loan operations. during the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. This manifested itself 
in several ways. Banco Agricola had only a rudimentary understanding of how to organize 
itself for agricultural lending operations in those early years. The IDB played a valuable 
role in training Banco Agricola's staff to adopt modem management techniques and to avoid 
some of the more blatant political intrusions in bank portfolio management. Credit 
manuals, loan forms, accounting procedures, criteria for loan classification of clie.nts and, 
more recently, computerization of loan acoounts have all been introduced and carried out 
through the institutional influence of successive IDB programs in the bank. There was no 
other international institution prepared or interested in carrying out this role in the mid· 
1970s and early 1980s for Banco Agricola. This institution·building role and the associated 
learning processes have been the most important contribution of IDB and its influence 
continues in bank operating procedures long after the decline in IDB funding. 
Having said this, however, it must be pointed out that the IDB credit philosophy and 
operating guidelines also introduced important negative features into portfolio management 
techniques, compromising the long run viability of Banco Agricola. Little consideration was 
given in this respect to Banco Agricola's own perceptions and interes~ Rather. IDB 
standard criteria were imposed. First were the detailed targeting criteria introduced through 
3 
IDB lines of credit. These were documented and discussed in some detail in the Graham, 
Poyo, and Aguilera paper. These targeting requirements reduced the ability of Banco 
Agricola to determine individual creditworthiness, with the accompanying increase in loan 
default, and increased transaction costs for both the borrowers and the bank. Too many 
bureaucratic steps and delays in disbursement are common. 
The second pernicious influence was the IDB pressure to engage in quick massive 
disbursement of funds to a large number of targeted clientele, way beyond the loan 
evaluation capacity of the bank's staff. Moreover, the bank was generally penalized with 
fines if its disbursement schedule lagged. In the end, this pressure reduced incentives for 
the bank's staff to engage in any careful risk-adjusted evaluation of potential loan recovery 
for clients. Thus, it is not surprising to note the rather high delinquency and default rates 
recorded for the IDB loan clientele in the Graham, Poyo, and Aguilera paper, particularly 
when compared to the lower default rates associated with the bank's freely managed 
(untargeted) own-capital portfolio, or the untargeted USAID-funded portfolio. 
A third issue, also associated with targeting, grew out of the IDB's refusal to raise 
its minimum loan size in the face of rising inflation. Banco Agricola officials commented 
on how this was severely restrictive in the inflation-driven 1980s. The resulting disburse-
ments were in effect too small in terms of loan ceilings, and too restrictive in terms of total 
permitted asset size for borrowers. This forced Banco Agricola to engage in costly defensive 
innovations, to get around the IDB's inflexibility on this issue. 
Fourth, the stop and start syndrome in the disbursement of donor-sourced funds 
clearly characterized the IDB's flow of funding into Banco Agricola. Too much initial IDB-
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required negotiations for program agreement lead to delays, followed by abrupt disburse-
ments, rather than a steady flow of finance through time. The abrupt injections followed 
by sharp declines in IDB program monies can be seen in Table 1 for each one of the four 
IDB program sources. These sharp fluctuations generated asset management problems for 
the bank. The uneven flow of funds disturb and distort bank-client relationships. According 
to Banco Agricola field officers, it is precisely this uneven flow of funding that led to high 
delinquency and default in the IDB loan portfolio, as the interupted cash flow jeapordized 
the economic success of their clients' investment projects. The lack of permanency of the 
program weakened expectations about future lines of credit as an incentive for loan 
repayment. This largely explains the paradox of so many donor (ie. IDB) clients classified 
initially as excellent or very good credit risks terminating as defaulted clientele. After 1986, 
the flow of IDB financing was terminated, on the basis of deficiencies in the bank's financial 
viability and portfolio management that were in part due to the adoption of an IDB credit 
philosophy: a massive, non-selective injection of credit on concessional terms. Banco 
Agricola officials found this to be ironic. 
Fifth, IDB reporting requirements have been excessive. Over a dozen people were 
incorporated into the staff just to carry out the reporting requirements associated with 
targeted subsidized credit. Banco Agricola officials feel this was a costly and fruitless 
exercise. They further feel that very few people in IDB ever read these on-going reports 
or the credit input studies performed periodically at IDB's request. 
It would appear that the technical cooperation between outside IDB-hired specialists 
and Banco Agricola personnel have not always been satisfactory. The outside expert-visitors 
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were seldom well integrated into the bank's staff or operations. They invariably arrived with 
pre-conceived notions and rarely listened carefully to bank officials' views. A sign of 
unsatisfactory performance in this regard was the frequent hiring of similar experts to carry 
out the same tasks that were not implemented well following previous technical assistance 
missions. 
It is also pertinent to underscore the fact that different departments within the IDB 
talk differently concerning appropriate portfolio management techniques and credit 
philosophies. Some continue to promote the old supply-led, targeted credit philosophy, 
while others emphasize financial viability and more responsible risk-management 
procedures. Banco Agricola officials frequently referred to this confusing lack of a definitive 
philosophy. This no doubt reflects an on-going process of professional maturation and 
intellectual debate within IDB itself. 
By the mid-1980s, Banco Agricola faced a crossroads. The bank found itself largely 
cut off from international donor funding, particularly new IDB funding. Ironically, the bank 
now experienced criticism from IDB officials for the very consequences (growing arrears and 
default) brought on by following their supply-led, targeted disbursement advice from the 
mid-1970s onwards. Now the touchstone became financial viability, unsubsidized interest 
rates, and reduced arrears which, of course, is very different from the earlier IDB emphasis. 
Thus Banco Agricola has been forced to follow two somewhat contradictory paths to 
maintain its operations since the mid-1980s. The first was to mobilize domestic savings 
deposits through a more aggressive campaign of deposit mobilization. It is unlikely that this 
initiative, assisted by Ohio State University advisors, would have borne fruit, as it has, if low-
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cost international donor funds had remained available. The second path was increased 
capitalization by the Dominican Government. This unfortunately reopened the door of 
targeted credit to a large number of high-risk and unmonitorable clientele, that has in turn 
worsened the delinquency and default indicators of the bank's portfolio. 
The bank has thus a dual portfolio structure. On the one side is a responsible, low-
arrears portfolio of loans serviced through savings deposits and the bank's own capital funds 
as well as AID's revolving fund. On the other side is the large Government-directed portion 
of the portfolio, with high arrears. The IDB's remaining portfolio falls between these two 
performance parameters. It is ironical that just when international donors began to change 
their credit philosophies to emphasize financial viability, unsubsidized interest rates, and 
responsible risk management in lending with strong savings mobilization, the Government 
now enters the scene ressurecting all the pernicious targeted, subsidized, credit policies and 
leading to unacceptably high-risk exposure and high defaults in Banco Agricola's portfolio. 
Clearly, the future role for donors and, in particular, the IDB is to counter this self-
defeating political intrusion into Banco Agricola's portfolio by the Dominican Government. 
Documentation of loan repayment status for the bank's portfolio has now been made 
possible through the computerization of all loan accounts. The disturbing state of the 
portfolio is now more thoroughly understood by the bank•s officials and the desire to attain 
greater financial autonomy from the Government is strong. It is also important for the bank 
to gain the freedom to fire incompetent personnel and reward well performing staff, to 
maintain morale and discipline. It is also important for the bank to be allowed to raise its 
interest rates even more, to aggressively compete for domestic savings deposits and offset 
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the rising rates of inflation. Further investment in software programs for effective loan 
tracking is called for, so that the bank can use its computer hardware facilities better to 
secure financial viability in its loan operations. IDB leadership in promoting these new 
directions for Banco Agricola (and countering the Government's negative intervention) 
could make a major contribution to the future of the institution. 
Table 1: Banco Agricola Relative Importance of the IDB Programs in Banco Agricola's Total Portfolio, 1978-1989. 
Year Plan 21 Plan 27 Plan 34 Plan 37 IDB Programs Bank's Portfolio % 
1978 13,531,323 8,345,852 21,877,175 136,551,688 16.02 
1979 10,267,920 21,622,849 31,890,769 176, 141,021 18.11 
1980 7,972,040 22,593,184 29,468,383 60,033,607 225,652, 744 26.60 
1981 6,477,114 19,007,516 38,933,256 64,417,886 248,365,029 25.94 
1982 5,324,161 15,636,864 40,470,081 61,431,106 251,915,230 24.39 
1983 4,372,283 12,098,516 32,194,849 7,696,943 56,362,591 255,542,211 22.06 
1984 3,555,387 8,342,877 18,586,125 18,873,778 49,358,167 239,905,550 20.57 
1985 3,490,380 7,996,865 17,895,549 21,926,262 51,309,056 247,112,451 20.76 
1986 2,178,262 4,447,662 10,152,987 52,112,236 68,891,147 282,424,070 24.39 
1987 7,783,621 3,215,265 8,107,991 55,289,026 68,395,903 398,087,951 17.18 
1988 1,564,348 2,137,141 5,756,575 39,085,523 48,543,587 667,623,650 7.27 
1989 1,314,644 1,582,702 4,42°'196 30,493,871 37,811,413 855,902,647 4.42 
12-Year Total 620,322,407 3,985,224,242 15.57 
